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Abstract
The way research is, and should be, funded by the public sphere is the subject of renewed interest
for sociology, economics, management sciences, and more recently, for the philosophy of science.
In this  contribution,  I  propose a qualitative,  epistemological  criticism of the funding by lottery
model, which is advocated by a growing number of scholars as an alternative to peer-review. This
lottery  scheme  draws  on  the  lack  of  efficiency  and  of  robustness  of  the  peer-review  based
evaluation  to  argue  that  the  majority of  public  resources for  basic  science should  be  allocated
randomly. I first differentiate between two distinct arguments used to defend this alternative funding
scheme  based  on  considerations  about  the  logic  of  scientific  research.  To  assess  their
epistemological limits, I then present and develop a conceptual frame, grounded on the notion of
“system of practice”,  which can be used to understand what  precisely it  means,  for a  research
project, to be interesting or significant. I use this epistemological analysis to show that the lottery
model is not theoretically optimal, since it underestimates the integration of all scientific projects in
densely interconnected systems of conceptual,  experimental,  or technical  practices which confer
their proper interest to them.  I also apply these arguments in order to criticize the classical peer-
review process. I finally suggest, as a discussion, that some recently proposed models that bring to
the fore a principle of decentralization of the evaluation and selection process may constitute a
better alternative, if the practical conditions of their implementation are adequately settled. 
Introduction
The way science is, and should be, funded by the public sphere has been the subject of renewed
interest for the last decade. Firstly, scientists themselves have proposed various contributions which
try to derive proposals for funding schemes from a description of the research process (Braben
2008; Couée 2013; Cadogan 2014). Should we let scientists themselves decide how to distribute
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money in a decentralized way (Bollen  et al. 2014)? Should we promote a competition between
projects, or allocate permanent funds (Couée 2013; Vaesen and Katsav 2017)? Should we trust peer-
review, or choose the projects randomly (Gillies 2014)? Secondly, there is a relatively voluminous
literature in economics, management science, and sociology that aims at characterizing the effects
of contemporary modifications of funding policies on the production of knowledge (Gläser and
Velarde  2018).  These works  study, for  instance,  the  role  of  funding agencies  as intermediaries
between states and scientists (Edler et al. 2014), grant writing practices in academia (Velarde 2018),
the  diversification  of  sources  of  funding  (Luukkonen  2014),  or  the  mechanisms  of  research
evaluation (Musselin 2014).  These studies are valuable as descriptions of the effects of funding
arrangements on the production of knowledge. However, their practical normative interests seem to
be limited by their failure in deducing normative conditions for the public funding of science. The
recent state of the art proposed by Gläser and Velarde (2018) states that this literature does not
succeed in “establish[ing] clear causal relationships between funding and the content and conduct of
research” (p.  4).  The complexity and the variety of  funding environments is  a  real  obstacle  to
drawing general conclusions about the epistemic consequences of the choice of one given funding
scheme over another.   
Social  epistemology  has  recently  manifested  a  strong  desire  to  play  such  a  normative  role  in
forming policies on the governance of science (Petrovitch and Viola, 2018). In particular, agent-
based models have been proposed which try to characterize the epistemic effects of a given funding
policy.  On  the  basis  of  a  model  of  epistemic  landscapes  (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009),  Avin
(2018a) tested various possible funding schemes, including a classic peer-review process based on
the evaluation of the epistemic significance of the projects, and a lottery mechanism that distributes
at least part of the resources randomly. Interestingly, this last proposition is strongly defended by
various scholars coming from different fields, from natural science to social epistemology (Brezis
2007; Fang and Casadevall  2016; Avin 2018b,c;  Gross and Bergstrom 2019, Roumbanis 2019).
Random funding is then conceived of as a way of bypassing the recognized difficulties of peer-
review to identify in a reliable and reproducible manner the merits of the projects to be funded
(Graves 2011; Lee 2013; Boudreau 2016). However, even if we accept these classical criticisms of
peer-review, is random funding really the most efficient way of overcoming such difficulties? Or is
it simply a last resort solution, which consists in suppressing the evaluation and selection process
rather than trying to reform it?  Besides these epistemological considerations, taking seriously the
“social” dimension of social epistemology might also imply considering how funding schemes take
into account the societal impact of scientific research. For instance, peer-review based selection
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may be strongly committed to considering social needs. An overview of the rich history of the peer-
review process shows how it has managed the balance between the scientific and societal interests
of research projects, with regards to the discipline,  to the funding agency, and to the historical
evolution of perspectives on the place and role of science. Without going into too much detail on
this point which exceeds the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the evaluation of the societal
impact of scientific research is currently a central issue for various funding agencies, even those
dedicated to basic science. This focus on societal impact is quite a common subject of complaints
from scientists who feel constrained to insist on the (sometimes over-sold) social importance of
their research (O'Malley et al. 2009; Haufe 2013), or who consider that basic science is endangered
by the importance given to social, political or economic needs (Schauz 2014). Recently, the notion
of “Responsible Research and Innovation”, which gained importance in the context of the H2020
European framework for the funding of science (Rip 2016), aims to accentuate the consideration of
societal  impact  in  evaluating  research  projects2.  By contrast,  random funding,  in  the  way it  is
presented by its advocates, is not specifically designed to evaluate the societal impact of scientific
research.  The  lottery model  is  notably restricted  by Avin  (2018a,b)  to  a  fundamental  or  basic
research, which would be separated from pressing utilitarian considerations external to the scientific
field. 
The aim of this  article is first  to propose a specific criticism, mainly based on epistemological
considerations3,  of random allocation as an alternative to peer-review and, second, to propose an
alternative principle of decentralization for the funding of science. I suggest that the associated
funding scheme might perform better than either lottery or classical peer-review. In section 2, I give
an overview of the contributions recently proposed to defend random allocation as an alternative to
peer-review, and I reconstruct two central arguments that require discussion. In section 3, I develop
a criticism of these arguments. To do so, I consider some features of the internal dynamics of the
research  process  in  order  to  suggest  that  random allocation  might  not  be  an  optimal  selection
process. I show that these analyses may also be used to criticize the classical peer-review process
(section 4).  I also show how they can be used to discuss the relevance of random funding and of
peer-review with respect to consideration of the societal impact of science.  Finally, I suggest that
2The different H2020 calls for tenders published by the European Commission often makes explicit reference to this 
notion of responsible research as a mean of orienting scientific choices (see, for instance, the “Science with and for 
society” program, https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820-
swfs_en.pdf) 
3I also evoke, as another important dimension to take into account, the question of the societal impact of scientific 
research.
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my epistemological analysis implies that a more decentralized method of allocating resources might
be preferable both to random funding and to classical peer-review (section 5). 
2-Main arguments for a (more or less) random funding scheme
Criticisms of  peer-review based evaluation of  research projects by national funding agencies are
not  new and take  many different  forms.  Even if  this  contribution  does  not  aim to  provide  an
exhaustive historical overview of these arguments which have been formulated over at least three
decades (see, for instance, Travis and Collins 1991), let us recall that among other criticisms, peer-
review in its current forms has been criticized for being biased by individual values (Lee 2013),
which may lead to forms of nepotism and sexism (Wenneras and Wold 1997);  for privileging safe
projects  over  risky  ones  (O'Malley  et  al. 2009;  Haufe  2013);  or  for  depending  more  on  the
particular  cognitive  interests  of  the  evaluators  than  on  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  proposals
themselves (Boudreau 2016).   Quite recently, a general criticism has arisen4, which highlights the
fact that peer-review based funding is aleatory for a large proportion of funded projects (Mayo et al.
2006;  Graves  2011;  Fogelholm  et  al. 2012). This  argument,  grounded  on  numerous  empirical
studies, highlights a major obstacle for the reliability and efficiency of peer-review (Snell 2015).
First, panels of reviewers might not be able to evaluate and compare in a robust and reproducible
way the intrinsic value of the proposed projects. Second, and consequently, the overall process of
peer-review,  which  implies  the  time-consuming  writing  and  evaluation  of  proposals,  would
represent a waste of time and money in the current highly competitive environment (Roumbanis
2019).
Based  on these  findings,  various  scholars  have  tried  to  elaborate  alternative  funding  schemes.
Among them, a proposition that is gaining a growing interest in the literature5, is one based on the
introduction of a random element in the mechanisms of funding. Brezis (2007) first proposed a
process of  “focal randomization” for the funding of R&D by governments. In a nutshell, the idea is
the following: the projects that are chosen without  ambiguity by all  the reviewers are adopted.
Similarly, projects unanimously judged as valueless are excluded. For the projects that are situated
between these two extremes, a lottery system would randomly choose the projects to be funded.
4We thank an anomymous reviewer for advising us that this criticism can also be found in older contributions, such as 
Cole et al. (1981).
5And, more marginally, in the practices of funding. Let us cite, for instance, the “Explorer Grants” of the Health 
Research Council of New Zealand, the “Science for Technology Innovation Seed Project” in New Zealand, or the 
“Experiment!” grants of the Volkswagen foundation. 
4
This mechanism is thus supposed to diminish the often-cited bias of peer-review, in particular its
preference  towards  “conformity”  (p.  1),  and  its  dependence  on  the  individual  preferences  and
interests of evaluators. Pursuing the same objectives, Fang and Casadevall (2016) have proposed a
very similar solution, which they call “modified lottery”. Avin (2018, a, b, c) has summarized and
defended these arguments by using an interesting agent-based modeling approach inspired by the
literature on the division of cognitive labor (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009). His conclusions are
similar to those mentioned before: at least in some cases (notably, when the epistemic field to be
explored is poorly known), a system of lottery which randomly allocates resources may out-perform
the classical peer-review process. Indeed, in these cases (that Avin assimilates to “basic research”,
p. 33), it would be very difficult for a panel of reviewers to estimate the interest6 (in Avin's social
epistemology vocabulary, the “utility function”) of a given project, and random allocation would
then limit the bias linked to  a priori  evaluation.  This solution is defended on the basis of more
qualitative arguments by Roumbanis (2019) which brings to the fore its potential for increasing
“epistemic  diversity,  fairness  and  impartiality  within  academia”.  Finally,  Gross  and  Bergstrom
(2019) defend partial  randomization on the basis  of  economic arguments:  when the number of
grants is small, the preparation of numerous research proposals that will never be funded constitutes
a significant waste of time, and thus diminishes the overall efficiency of the funding scheme based
on peer-review. 
An overview of the pro-lottery literature indicates that different kinds of argument  are proposed in
favor of a random allocation of resources by funding agencies. A first category attacks the various
kinds of  systemic bias classically associated with peer-review, that we recalled at the beginning of
this  section.  These  bias  might  be  linked  to  personal  characteristics  (sex,  ethnicity),  to  the
institutional reputation of the researchers, or to their institutional affiliation.  This first category of
argument, which is indeed entirely relevant, specifically concerns the intersubjective interactions
between  reviewers  and  grant-seekers.  In  this  paper,  we  rather  focus  on  another  group  of
justifications for the lottery model, which are grounded on a certain conception of the very logic of
scientific inquiry.  We divide this second family of arguments into two main branches. The first can
be called the “exploration” argument, and it argues that random funding may allow the funding of
projects  whose interest  is difficult  to evaluate at  a given moment,  because they present a high
degree of novelty in the method used or in the goal which is pursued. This argument is notably the
one  elaborated  by  Avin  (2018  a,b,c).  The  second,  which  one  might  call  the  “equally-good”
6Let me note that in this frame, the interest of a project is judged with respect to the overall goal pursued within the
concerned “epistemic field”. 
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argument, insists on the fact that many projects seem to be of equal intrinsic value if we refer to the
existing corpus of knowledge, techniques and scientific questions. For these two arguments, partial
random  allocation  would  thus  have  a  double  advantage:  a  gain  of  time  and  money,  and  the
correction of some supposed defaults of peer-review, notably its overall conservatism and its strong
dependence on the subjectivity of the evaluator.
In section 3, I suggest that both these arguments (the explorer and the equally-good) are mistaken
for the same epistemological reason. In a nutshell, my argument is founded on the idea that random
funding is a last resort solution which underestimates the density of the interconnections between
the  variety  of  technical,  experimental,  conceptual,  and  theoretical  scientific  goals,  and  which
overestimates  the  frequency  of  isolated,  genuinely  “exploratory”  programs,  whose  interest  for
current scientific practices is hard to estimate.
3-Funding science by lottery: an epistemological criticism
I begin this section by a presentation of the epistemological grounds of my argument: the notion of
system of scientific practice as characterizing the very structure of the research process (section 3-
a); then I return to the random allocation models and explain why they might be not an optimal
solution (section 3-b). 
a-Systems of  scientific practice
The so-called “practice turn” in contemporary history and philosophy of science  (Soler 2014) is
characterized by an explicit  desire to study scientific practices in all  their  diversity (Nordmann
2015).  This practice  turn generally  aims  at  replacing  a  certain  view  of  scientific  progress
characterized as “traditional” in which scientific dynamics are considered as “primarily generated
and  shaped by theoretical  developments”  (Ankeny  and Leonelli  2016,  p.  18).  The question  of
knowing whether this historical reading of the transition from a “theory-focused” to a “practice-
oriented”  philosophy of  science  is  fully  correct  remains  open.  The important  point  is  that  this
practical turn was accompanied by an attempt to integrate the different kinds of scientific practice
into a (more or less) systematic view of scientific development. I will retain here the conceptual
frame proposed by Chang (2014) in which scientific activities are integrated into hierarchical and
interconnected  systems of practice. In Chang's view, scientific activities, whether they consist in
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technical,  instrumental,  experimental,  or  mental  operations  (manipulating  live  cells,  lighting  a
match,  testing a microscope,  isolating a phenomenon in the laboratory, defining a concept)  are
considered  as  actions  or  activities,  performed  by  an  epistemic  agent  in  order  to  fulfill  “an
identifiable  aim” (p.  72).  An important  point  is  that  all  these  activities  possess  both  “inherent
purposes” (their local, internal objective) and “external functions” (the more general aims to which
they contribute).  For instance, the act of lighting a match mobilizes a set of internal operations,
which are accomplished in order to fulfill this objective. But it may also be part of a more global
process,  for  instance,  lighting  a  Bunsen  burner.  This  last  objective  may  itself  be  an  activity
developed to fulfill a larger goal: leading an experiment, in order to find of a new therapy or to
answer a theoretical question, for example.  Finally, each scientific activity, whether it be technical,
instrumental,  experimental,  or  theoretical,  takes  place  in  a  network  of  superposed  objectives,
constituting  what  Chang  names a  system  of  practice7.  Obviously,  because  of  this  continuous
superposition of  goals, what counts as a system of practice is not fixed. It is relative to the scale at
which we observe it; that is to say, it depends on the objective to which we choose to refer when
describing the research process or project under consideration. As we will argue bellow, this notion
of  system  of  practice  might  also  be  extended  by  taking  into  account  wider  societal  goals  of
research. 
Importantly, a given activity may belong to different systems of practice. For instance, the activity
of  preparing  a  sample  for  an  observation  in  electronic  microscopy may be  shared  by biology,
chemistry, or physics. To take a more precise toy-example, let us imagine a general objective O: the
identification  of  the  proteins  involved  in  the  replication  mechanisms of  a  given  virus  V.  This
objective may be important both for fundamental biology, which is interested in the comprehension
of the molecular networks underlying life processes, and bio-medicine, which may look for a new
treatment  against  V.   O  is  thus  shared  by distinct  communities,  possibly  embedded  in  distinct
systems of practice. In this frame, we can imagine a group of researchers trying to develop new
anti-viral  molecules  targeting  the  replication  mechanisms.  To do  so,  they  may  develop  a  new
technique T to isolate and purify the proteins involved in this molecular network. Yet this technique
T may also be interesting for other scientific communities: by example, for bacteriologists looking
for a new vaccine or antibiotics against a resistant bacteria B. The objective of developing T is thus
also shared by another system of practice.
7A useful graphic representation of Chang’s notion of system of practice is presented in the commentary of Chang’s text
by L. Soler and R. Catinaud (Soler 2014, p. 80-92).  
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Let me use a more concrete example to illustrate the structure of the systems of practice: the works
led by Beadle and Tatum (1941) on Neurospora to discover the links between genes and enzymes.
As shown by Kay (1989), Beadle and Tatum started with a typical cognitive question, which had
emerged  from  the  state  of  knowledge  and  practice  in  biochemistry  and  genetics:  are  genes
enzymes, or do they determine the functioning of enzymes? To solve this research question, they
used culture media depleted in some of the nutrients necessary for their biological model of growth
(the Neurospora mold). When choosing these depleted nutrients, they selected molecules which had
an  interest  for  agronomy and  food companies  (certain  important  vitamins).  The choice  of  this
specific protocol to answer the cognitive question at stake was clearly driven by Beadle and Tatum's
desire to make their work also useful for another kind of problem (namely, the dosage of vitamins
in food, see Kay [1989] and Morange [2000] for details), which was the motor of another system of
scientific practice, developed by agro-food industries. Importantly, these interconnections between
different kinds of research questions operate at different levels of the systems of practice. First, the
overall cognitive, theoretical issue of the nature and role of genes was important both for cognitive
purposes (in biochemistry and genetics), and for agronomy, since genetics was also very useful in
agriculture (Harwood 1987).  Second, at a smaller scale, the technique used to answer this cognitive
question (the choice of the growth media) was also independently connected to another kind of
problem (the vitamins supply in food) which was important for agro-food systems of practice. This
simple  example  thus  shows  that  a  given  research  project  may  exhibit  a  multiplicity  of
interconnections  between  different  kinds  of  theoretical,  experimental,  and  technical  practices
coming from distinct  systems of practice.  The density  of  these interconnections determines  the
overall  interest of the given project, as being itself  structured by a superposition of theoretical,
experimental, and technical activities.
These examples suggest that if we consider all the (technical, experimental, theoretical) dimensions
of scientific activities, the research process appears to be structured by a set of interconnected and
hierarchically organized objectives of different natures: technical, instrumental, experimental, but
perhaps also cognitive or utilitarian. In this framework, the intrinsic  interest of a given research
process depends on its integration within this complex network of scientific practices. Here, this
central notion of interest should be understood as being nearly equivalent to that of “significance”
in Kitcher's (2001, 2011) model of “well-ordered science”, elaborated as an alternative to classical
peer-review evaluation of research projects. Let us recall here that Kitcher's aim is to make external
(economical, political, societal) needs more visible in science policy choices. For Kitcher, it is thus
necessary to recognize  that the significance of a research project is linked to the convergence of
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different kinds of objective and, in particular, cognitive and utilitarian goals8. In Beadle and Tatum's
example, the effective mix of different kinds of objectives may illustrate  this view, by showing the
fine interactions, at different levels of the research activities (general goals pursued, experiments
and  technics  implemented),  of  the  scentific  field  with  the  whole  societal  sphere.  These
considerations might also lead us to adopt a broader view of the notion of system of practice than
that  of  Chang.  Indeed,  the  local  interconnection of  the  research activities is  not  limited to  the
scientific field: it also includes problems identified in the social, political, economical spheres. In
this specific example, these interactions concern both the general objectives of the research, and the
technical practices developed to fulfill it.  More generally, the hypothesis I make here is that all
systems of scientific practice might be connected, at different levels, with needs or issues external
to the scientific field. A good funding scheme should then be able to identify these interactions and
to consider them in the overall evaluation of the research projects. 
  
b-Random funding: why it might not be optimal
Let me recall the central elements of the two general arguments commonly used to defend random
funding by considering the logic of scientific research. The “explorer” argument insists on the fact
that some projects presenting a high degree of novelty, and whose intrinsic value is hard to evaluate,
might not be correctly assessed by a panel of reviewers.  The “equally-good” one interprets the
observed variability  of  peer-review by the difficulty  of  comparing (on the  basis  of  the  current
corpus of knowledge, methods and research questions) the interests of projects whose value appears
to be nearly equivalent. 
These two positions are thus based on a double hypothesis: (i) there really do exist many (or a
sufficient number to justify a random allocation) research projects whose  interest (in the sense I
gave previously to  this  notion)  cannot  be comparatively assessed,   either  because  they are too
innovative, or because there is no objective reason to favor them over other equally good proposals;
(ii)  random allocation is thus, most of the time, the best way to apprehend the complex network of
interconnected  (technical,  experimental,  theoretical)  scientific  practices  (proposition P).  This
proposition P may be justified in a theoretical or in a practical dimension: P is true if it is logically
or practically impossible to find a better way to assess the comparative interest of a research project
(that  is  to  say,  the  way it  is  integrated into  the systems of  scientific  practice).  To address  the
8To recall the central example used by Kitcher (2001, p. 63), the cloning of the sheep Dolly in 1997 brought together
general,  large-scale epistemic goals (understanding the mechanisms of differentiation of cells) and utilitarian goals
(creating GMOs, improving livestock, etc.). 
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practical dimension of P, the best solution is certainly to propose an alternative method of funding
that could be shown to be better in evaluating the interest of a given project. The aim of this paper is
not to propose such a model, but I will show in section 5 how some recent idealized proposals for
rethinking the mechanisms of the funding of  science may constitute  possible starting points to
dismiss P in its practical dimensions. What about the theoretical dimension of the pro-lottery thesis
P? If  we  admit  the  image  I  gave  previously, P may  be  severely  weakened  as  a  theoretical
affirmation. Indeed, if we recognize that the research process is structured by a dense network of
interconnected and hierarchically-organized scientific  objectives,  from the most technical  to the
most theoretical, then we have to deduce (against the “explorer” argument) that there may exist just
a few projects (or at least, fewer projects than supposed by the pro-lottery arguments) that are so
isolated from existing practices that it  would be impossible to estimate in any robust way their
comparative  interest.  More  generally,  my thesis  here  is  that  the  theoretical  defense  of  random
funding as the best alternative to peer-review is  mistaken as it  underestimates the fact that the
structure of the systems of scientific practice constraints strongly (or more strongly that assumed in
pro-lottery literature) the kind of project that may be considered (relatively) interesting-that is to
say, useful for a (relatively) large number of scientific practices, including technical, experimental
or theoretical activities.  Because of these interconnections, it seems reasonable to suppose: (a) that
there are not a large number of “exploratory” projects that are strongly disconnected theoretically,
experimentally  and  technically  from  existing  systems  of  practices;  and  (b)  that  it  is  at  least
theoretically possible to obtain a more precise comparison of the value of “equally good” projects if
we take into account the various kinds of objectives of different kinds they pursue. In other words,
the “explorer” and the “equally-good” arguments would need  to be grounded on a more thorough
conception of the very dynamics of the research process itself to be fully convincing.
What can we say about the other dimension of the science funding problem   —that is, the degree to
which we take into account the societal  impact of scientific research? As we noted before, the
lottery model is explicitly presented as applying to basic, or fundamental  science, since it might not
be relevant to funding research on pressing social needs (Avin 2018, b). Consequently, applied or
use-inspired science on the one hand, and fundamental  science on the other,  should be funded
according to separate mechanisms. Yet, we have suggested that the notion of system of practice, if
understood in a broad perspective including both the scientific field and the whole social, economic
and  political  sphere,  leads  to  consideration  of  the  fine  interactions  which  exist  between  the
problems  identified  by  scientists  and  social  needs.  These  interactions  operate  at  all  levels  of
10
scientific activity, and a lottery process for the funding of science might underperform in identifying
these convergences.  
The next step is to test how these arguments might apply to classical peer-review, before proposing
an alternative both to peer-review and to random funding. 
4-What about classical peer-review?
Even if  the main objective of this paper is to give a criticism of the funding by lottery model, it
could be interesting to  test whether these arguments might also be applied to a discussion of the
relevance of a more classical peer-review process.  One of the features of this peer-review based
selection of research projects is the evaluation, by a limited college of experts, of the intrinsic value
of  the  research  projects  under  consideration  in  a  given discipline  or  specialty.  This  evaluation
establishes  a  balance  between  the  epistemic  interest,  the  feasibility,  and  the  societal  impact,
depending on the funding agency and on the funding program. As we have highlighted previously,
ciriticisms of peer-review insist on the subjective bias due to the very composition of the college of
experts. If we focus here strictly on cognitive or intellectual bias (and not on subjective bias), a
general criticism would be that the limitation of the sources of expertise (due to the limited size of
the panels)  gives a partial and/or biased estimation of the  interest of a given project for a whole
scientific community9. It  is  worth noting that  our remarks about the structure of the system of
scientific practice might be used to reinforce this criticism. Indeed, the small-scale interconnections
between systems of practice may be largely transverse to existing academic disciplines or research
groups, and thus to panels of experts. If we follow the broad conception of the notion of system of
practice  we  proposed  in  the  previous  section,  this  argument  is  also  applicable  to  suggest  that
classical peer-review is not optimal in taking into consideration the societal impact of research.
Limited  groups  of  experts  might  have  difficulties  indeed  in  identifying  local,  small  scales
interactions between  the scientific field and the social, economical and political spheres. A central
9This argument is quite old, since it goes in the sense of classical Polanyi's (1962) criticism of all forms of centralized
control of the orientations of science. For Polanyi, the best way of  managing scientific systems is to let each scientist
collect  the  necessary  informations  to  make  his  own  choices  about  the  orientations  of  his  research.  Clearly,  this
theoretical argument is not adapted to the practical constraints linked to the limitation of resources: a choice has to be
done between research projects, and consequently an evaluation of the projects is necessary, which limits individual
scientific freedom.  Besides, in Polanyi's view, external (societal, political or economic) concerns should not interfere
with fundamental science, which puts aside the question of the societal impact of scientific research. However, it is
worth noting now that Polanyi's view that “subsidies should be curtailed in areas where their yields (...) tend to be low
(...).  So  long  as  each  allocation  follows  the  guidance  of  scientific  opinion  (...)  the  distribution  of  grants  will
automatically yield the maximum advantage for the advancement of science as a whole” ( Ibid., p.60-61) is not very far
from the arguments I develop in the following of the paper.
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challenge, given these conclusions,  is to assess if  it  is  practically possible to  outline a funding
scheme that would efficiently take into account our epistemological analysis, and which might do
better than both random funding and peer-review evaluation. 
5-Discussion: a more decentralized way of evaluating and funding science?
In  the  current  interdisciplinary  debates  on  the  conditions  of  the  funding  of  science  by  (often,
national) agencies, the random allocation of resources as an alternative to peer-review is gaining a
growing popularity in the literature.  In this paper, I have proposed a theoretical criticism of this
lottery  solution,  by  suggesting  that  all  research activities  are  embedded in a  dense  network  of
objectives of different natures (technical, experimental, theoretical, but also cognitive or utilitarian)
which  determine  their  interest  for  existing  systems  of  practice.  As  I  noted  in  section  3,  this
theoretical criticism should be completed in a practical plan by proposing an alternative funding
scheme which could be better adapted  than either classical peer-review or random allocation. My
aim is obviously not to elaborate such a model, but I believe my previous epistemological analysis
may be used to defend a more decentralized way of selecting projects10. 
Various idealized models were recently proposed which consider that resource allocation should be
a  collective  epistemic  duty  that  should  not  be  centralized  in  the  hands  of  expert  panels11.  For
instance, Bollen (2014) argues for a system of  “scientific agency” where each researcher would be
in charge of directly allocating a certain amount of money to the individuals he wants to have
funded. Barnett  et al. (2017) defend a “democratic” system, where each researcher expresses his
preferences by voting for a certain number of scientists who deserve to be funded. Even if these
models are still projected ideas and are far from constituting operational funding schemes, they are
interesting insofar as they introduce a principle of decentralization to the selection process. Such a
principle of decentralization might be relevant if we consider the epistemological analysis given in
section 3.  Indeed, in this frame, the comparative interest of a given project is determined by the
multiplicity of its interactions with existing systems of scientific practices.  Thus, a central quality
of a good funding scheme is its ability to identify and measure this convergence of interests coming
from distinct theoretical, experimental, and technical scientific activities, and from distinct systems
10Obviously, these theoretical arguments should confront with arguments from sociology, management sciences or the 
political sciences. 
11It should be noted here that these models do not consider the articulation between public and private funding. 
Similarly, the way these distinct sources of funding should be articulated in the frame of the decentralized model I 
propose in the following remains an open issue.
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of  practice,  on  specific  research  projects.  Reciprocally,  a  centralized  funding  scheme,  using  a
limited college of experts selected for their belonging to one given discipline or sub-discipline,
tends to render these local, small-scale interactions invisible. It is thus tempting to consider that to
have a better vision of the comparative interest of the research projects in competition, we need to
enlarge the process of evaluation to a group of scientists that would be more representative of these
transdisciplinary networks of scientific practice. A more decentralized means of selection, where
each researcher would have the epistemic duty of selecting projects,  thus seems to be more in
conformity with these epistemic constraints than does random allocation, which appears to be a last
resort solution once the default of classical peer-review are taken as established. Obviously, such a
general idea needs to be thoroughly refined to be applicable as an efficient funding mechanism. The
way grant applications are written and presented12, but also the sociological relationships between
individuals  or  research  groups  are  important  issues  that  need  to  be  taken  into  account  when
developing a credible decentralized funding scheme.  Given these appeals to caution, it might be
useful  to  sketch  more  precisely  a  possible  funding  scheme  based  on  such  a  decentralization
principle.  The  challenge  here  is  to  test  whether  a  decentralization  principle  could  genuinely
constitute a more promising alternative than either random allocation or classical peer-review as an
efficient new way of evaluating and funding scientific research. 
Let us first  note that the abstract funding model proposed by Bollen (2014) might be sensitive to
various well-known biases that are also present in classical peer-review, and that the funding by
lottery  scheme  aims  to  avoid.  First,  it  implies  directly  funding  people,  and  not  projects.
Consequently,  we  might  expect  that  bias  linked  to  personal  characteristics  (Lee  2013),  to
intellectual authority, to interpersonal relationships, or to past success13 are even more operative
than in classical peer-review. This point is also higlithted by Barnett et al. (2017), which note that
more “democratic” ways of funding research, where individual scientists would directly vote for
colleagues, might be sensitive to various kinds of  bias14. Second, the direct distribution of resources
by scientists, if it was applied as such, would be strongly inefficient, because the popularity of a
researcher (and, even more, the relevance of a project), is certainly not in a linear relationship with
his material needs. 
12The way research projects are presented and written would indeed be profoundly modified in a more decentralized
model, since researchers might try to convince a larger audience of the multiple interests of their proposal. This would
encourage  scientists  to  insist  on  the  various  dimensions  of  their  activities,  from  the  most  technical  to  the  most
theoretical set of objectives they pursue, in order to make visible the possible interconnections between distinct systems
of practice. 
13We might cite here the famous “Matthew effect” operating in peer-review (see, for instance, Bol et al. 2018). 
14These possible bias include “vote rigging, lobbying and it [the funding of science] becoming a popularity contest” 
(Barnett et al. 2017, p. 1)
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However, I argue that if it would take a different form, a decentralized scheme of funding might
correct these bias, and constitute an interesting alternative both to peer-review and to the funding-
by-lottery model. I then propose setting up a decentralization principle in the following way. We
might  imagine,  rather  than  an  evaluation  of  people,  a  participative  evaluation  of  each project,
including  all  the  individual  researchers,  and  possibly  a  public  external  to  the  scientific  field:
citizens, groups of citizens, or their political representatives. The general idea would be that each
participant establishes a list of projects he wishes to get funded, given the limitations of the total
budget  allocated  by the funding agency. Basically,  the  projects  most  often  approved would  be
funded. This voting mechanism makes it possible to measure the convergence of individual interests
on specific  research projects.  In  other  words,  it  allows the identification of  projects  which are
significant  for  various  systems  of  practice.  In  this  frame,  the  evaluation  of  research  projects
becomes a collective epistemic duty, and not the role of a limited college of experts who cannot
represent  the  full  complexity  of  the  systems  of  scientific  practice.  If  it  does  not  eliminate  a
systematic  bias  in  peer-review  linked  to  personal  characteristics,  I  believe  that  a  scheme  that
followed this principle might attenuate such bias with respect to Bollen's (2014) model, which gives
a greater importance to people over projects. Besides, I would argue that given the conditions we
detail below to address certain crucial practical issues, it might offer a credible alternative both to
peer-review and to the lottery model.
Firstly, the participation of external publics in this process of evaluation and selection ensures local
interactions between the cognitive goals of research, and its broader societal impact. To improve
their  chance  of  getting  funded,  projects  should  clarify  their  concrete  implications  for  certain
segments  of  the  population,  or  for  society  as  a  whole.  However,  the  mechanisms  of  this
participation might be highly variable. A major issue is the nature of the participants: who should
have a right to vote? Should it be the citizens themselves or their representatives? Should it be some
identified stakeholders (NGOs, militant groups, etc.)? Another challenge is the management of the
balance between the choices made by scientists and those made by the external public: should we
focus on the intersection of preferences, and fund the projects that are approved by all the different
stakeholders (that is to say, which are present both in the priority lists of the  researchers and of the
external  participants)?  Or  should  we  merely  consider  the  overall  percentage  of  votes  for  each
project? Without entering into more details,  it  is  clear that  the chosen solution would reflect  a
certain  perspective  on  participation  (which  is  also  a  political  and  ethical  issue),  and  a  certain
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position about  the autonomy that  science should have with respect  to the social  and economic
worlds.
Secondly, such a decentralized model faces a range of practical questions concerning the flexibility
and  reactivity  of  the  funding  scheme.  Indeed,  systems  of  practice  evolve  continuously:  new
questions are raised, new technical needs appear, and new obstacles are identified. How should the
way we fund science be adapted to this essential feature of the dynamics of scientific research?
Clearly, this challenge is similar for all funding schemes, including the lottery model and classical
peer-review. The time-lapse of funding, on the one hand, and the possibility for scientists to freely
change the  direction of  their  inquiry on the other  seem to  be  two central  features  that  require
discussion. The very structure of the information flows between individuals and communities is also
crucial: the main expected virtue of the decentralization of funding is to gain access to a better
objective knowledge of the networks  of  practices of  different  kinds  (technical,  experimental or
cognitive)  that  characterize  the dynamics  of  scientific  research.  To do so,  such a decentralized
model imposes, first, that evaluation is a collective epistemic duty, and, second, that individual (or
group of) researchers have an interest in extending their knowledge of other systems of practices, in
order to convince various communities of the interest of their project 15. 
Thirdly, such a decentralized scheme of funding would have a impact on the structuration of the
scientific field in stable specialties and communities. On the one hand, some programs require vast
amounts of money which must be allocated on the basis of political,  large scale choices which
exceed classical procedures of resource distribution. We might refer here, for instance, to policies
concerning the exploration of space, or to major investments needed for further achievements in
theoretical  physics  (particle  accelerators).  This  is  not  in  contradiction  with  our  decentralized
scheme, which is conceived of as an alternative to the standard calls for tender of national funding
agencies.  On the  other  hand,  both a  random allocation  system and classical  peer-review might
promote the funding of domains of study only supported by a limited group of researchers. Contrary
to this, the alternative model I propose in the present discussion favors the overall interest of a given
project both inside and outside the scientific field. This might imply that some rare subjects could
disappear if they do not succeed in exhibiting their cognitive, technical or utilitarian value for other
systems of practice. This effect is a direct consequence of the epistemic model of the dynamics of
scientific research we have adopted in this paper. This theoretical background might obviously be
15In a more practical plan, various possibilities might be proposed. For instance, a system of key-words or expressions, 
similar to that used by  numerical tools of bibliography classification,  might ensure the identification of projects 
depending on their technical, experimental, cognitive objectives. 
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discussed on empirical grounds, exactly as I discuss the background hypotheses concerning the
logic of inquiry which justifies the funding-by-lottery solution. It is one of the aims of this paper to
bring to the fore the importance of the theoretical perspective on inquiry we (sometimes implicitly)
adopt when choosing a public funding scheme for science. As far as epistemology may have its say
in the debates concerning the governance of science, this explicitation of the models of scientific
development that drive our political choices is certainly one of the necessary tasks that philosophy
is best fitted to take in charge. 
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